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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The following synthesis offers information as to the impact, cost, advantages, and disadvantages 
of implementing system wide fare-free policies in various transit systems.  Information was 
gathered through the documented results of research done on case studies of fare-free 
experiments, and from active transit professionals with first-hand knowledge of the results of 
other fare-free demonstrations implemented by a variety of transit systems around the United 
States.   
 
The suggestion to offer transit on a fare-free basis is almost always well intended.  However, 
while fare-free policy might be successful for small transit systems in fairly homogenous 
communities, it is nearly certain that fare-free implementation would not be appropriate for 
larger transit systems. Two well-documented fare-free demonstrations in larger systems in 
Denver, Colorado and Trenton, New Jersey, conducted during the late 1970s, were limited to 
off-peak hours and were both discontinued after approximately one year in spite of increased 
ridership.  Since that time there has been only one other fare-free system-wide experiment in a 
large transit system, conducted in Austin, Texas from October 1989 until December 1990.  
While several large transit agencies (i.e., Seattle Metro; Denver, Colorado; Houston, Texas; 
Baltimore, Maryland; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; St. Louis, Missouri; and Tri-Met in Portland, 
Oregon) offer fare-free service on a small portion of their systems, there has not been a full fare-
free policy instituted on a system-wide basis since the experiment in Austin, Texas. The negative 
consequences of that experiment in particular, as well as the negative experiences in Denver and 
Trenton, have left lasting impressions on transit operators throughout the country.  No large 
transit system in the United States offers free fares on a system-wide basis at the present time. 
 
A fare-free policy will increase ridership; however, the type of ridership demographic generated 
is another issue.  In the fare-free demonstrations in larger systems reviewed in this paper, most of 
the new riders generated were not the choice riders they were seeking to lure out of automobiles 
in order to decrease traffic congestion and air pollution. The larger transit systems that offered 
free fares suffered dramatic rates of vandalism, graffiti, and rowdiness due to younger passengers 
who could ride the system for free, causing numerous negative consequences.  Vehicle 
maintenance and security costs escalated due to the need for repairs associated with abuse from 
passengers. The greater presence of vagrants on board buses also discouraged choice riders and 
caused increased complaints from long-time passengers.  Furthermore, due to inadequate 
planning and scheduling for the additional ridership, the transit systems became overcrowded 
and uncomfortable for riders.  Additional buses needed to be placed in service to carry the 
heavier loads that occurred on a number of routes, adding to the agencies’ operating costs.  
However, the crowded and rowdy conditions on too many of the buses discouraged many long-
time riders from using the system as frequently as they did prior to the implementation of free-
fares. 
 
Based upon the findings of this synthesis, it is concluded that a fare-free policy might be 
appropriate for smaller transit systems in certain communities, but is ill advised for larger transit 
systems in major urban areas.  Additionally, the results of this research demonstrate that a more 
effective way to increase choice ridership in larger systems would be to offer incentives such as 
reduced fares to students and the elderly, all-day passes, or pre-paid employer-provided passes to 
workers in areas served by transit.  All well-informed transit professionals that were contacted 
for their opinions spoke strongly against the concept of free fares for large systems, suggesting 
some minimal fare needs to be in place to discourage vagrancy, rowdiness, and a degradation of 
service.  It is also concluded that people are more concerned about issues such as safety, travel 
time, frequency and reliability of service, availability and ease of schedule and route 
information, infrastructure at stops, and driver courtesy, than they are about the cost of fares.  
When fares are eliminated, substantial revenues that help pay for such service characteristics are 
lost. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
From time to time, either transit policy board members or transit managers seriously consider the 
question of providing transit services free of charge to passengers.  There are a number of factors 
behind the motivation to offer fare-free transit, among them: a desire to increase the use of public 
transportation and possibly decrease traffic congestion; a recognition that farebox revenue is 
sometimes relatively minimal and possibly not worth the effort and expense to collect; a political 
desire to “fill empty buses;” a strategic effort to introduce younger people to transit services in 
order to encourage future ridership; a desire to accommodate certain niche passenger markets in 
resort areas where transit operating revenue can be gained through other sources; a strategic 
decision to help redevelopment of a particular area; or some other public policy goal.   
 
There are consequences to any operational transit policy, and those who make decisions about 
whether to offer fare-free service should be aware of the range of possible consequences.  There 
are many factors, which influence whether fare-free transit would be a negative or positive 
experience in any given environment.  Among these factors are the size of the community and 
transit system, the degree of commitment to fare-free service by both the community and the 
transit system management and employees, and the age and establishment of the transit service 
(Hodge, Orrell, & Strauss, 1994). 
 
This report will present both the advantages and disadvantages of fare-free service in differing 
transit system environments within the framework of several fundamental policy questions:  
! How much would it cost to implement a fare-free policy in the system;  
! What would be the impact of fare-free policy on existing transit services; and  
! How will fare-free policy affect the attainment of the transit system’s goals?  (Hodge et 
al, 1994) 
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ADVANTAGES OF FARE-FREE TRANSIT IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The impact of changes in transit fares on ridership is typically assessed by fare elasticity 
measures (Cervero, 1990; Baum, 1973; Lago, Mayworm & McEnroe, 1981; Doxsey, 1980).  Put 
most simply, fare elasticity is the change in ridership created by a certain percent change in fares. 
The industry standard for larger systems is the Simpson-Curtain rule, which sets elasticity at 
approximately -0.3 (Hodge et al., 1994).  For example, this means that a 10 percent decrease in 
fares will cause a 3 percent increase in ridership levels.  Theoretically, a 100 percent decrease in 
fares implemented in a transit system, when it becomes fare-free, should at least generate a 30 
percent increase in ridership (Yaden, 1998).  However, most systems experience an increase in 
ridership closer to 50 percent (Hodge et al., 1994).  Additionally, fare-free service should 
theoretically lead to: 
 
• Faster transit vehicle loading and unloading, due to the ability to use both front and rear 
doors 
• Less confusion over transfers and different types of fares 
• Lower administrative costs due to less need for paper transfers and less need for 
administrative boards to set fares (Olsen, 2000).   
 
 
COST OF FARE-FREE SERVICE 
 
The implementation of a fare-free policy may eliminate revenues collected, but it also eliminates 
costs associated with setting and collecting fares, such as for equipment, personnel, and 
insurance (Scheiner, 1976; Scheiner & Munder, 1978).  In smaller systems, fare collection costs 
are generally a higher percentage of the total operating costs than for larger systems (Hodge et 
al., 1994).  Additionally, a certain amount of overhead is associated with fare policy research and 
planning within transit organizations, including the solicitation of public input for every fare 
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policy change.  The elimination of fares would remove these costs and may free staff to focus on 
the quality and effectiveness of service, which is important in keeping and attracting choice 
ridership (Sims, 2001). 
 
 
IMPACT OF FARE-FREE POLICY ON TRANSIT SERVICE 
 
Two important dimensions of transit service are total ridership and quality of service.  How 
much will total ridership change if a fare-free policy is adopted?  Additionally, and most 
importantly, what type of ridership will a fare-free policy attract?  In general, as described above, 
fare-free policy generally results in a significant increase in ridership.  The standard for 
measuring increase in ridership is fare elasticity and is set at -0.3, as previously discussed.  
However, elasticity levels can vary by type of passenger, time of day, type of route, and length of 
time since the fare change was instituted (Cervero, 1990; Lago, Mayworm, & McEnroe, 1981).   
 
The farebox may be seen as a potential source of confusion and, subsequently, embarrassment to 
the uninitiated transit user (Hodge et al., 1994).  Imagine the effect if personal vehicles had 
fareboxes installed and every time one wanted to take a trip or use the car, he or she would be 
forced to find an exact amount of change.  Psychologically, this is the same effect caused by the 
uncertainty and complexity of fare collection to some existing and potential transit customers.  
And, although automobile users recognize that there is a cost over and above the cost of gasoline 
whenever they make a trip (such as insurance, car payment, and wear and tear on the vehicle), 
they are not inconvenienced by having to search for change and remembering routes and 
different fare prices when using their cars (Yaden, 1998).  
 
The types of ridership increases are also important.  That is, who will the transit service be 
attracting by offering fare-free service?  Hodge et al. (1994) propose that there are two positive 
sources of ridership change that can be accomplished by fare-free implementation: 
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• Transit riders who generally use their personal vehicles, attracted by the goal of 
decreasing auto use and fulfilling environmental objectives 
• Transit riders who would not have otherwise been able to make a trip to a job or social 
activity, who are provided with additional mobility 
 
It has been found that smaller transit systems, such as Island County in Washington State, 
Logan, Utah, and Wenatchee, Washington do not experience problem riders like those described 
in larger systems.  Many in those organizations attribute these positive results to educational 
efforts and an aggressive, zero-tolerance policy for unacceptable behavior while on board transit. 
 It could also be that smaller communities are less likely to confront the types of problem riders 
found in larger, more metropolitan areas.  Additionally, a smaller system makes it easier to keep 
track of problem riders (Hodge et al., 1994). 
 
IMPACT ON QUALITY OF SERVICE 
 
There are three parts to assessing the impact of fare-free policies on the quality of service:  
! To what extent will the increase in ridership affect the internal transit environment?  
! How will the change in ridership change goals of mobility, environmental quality, and 
land use patterns? And, to what extent will adopting a fare free policy increase the public 
transit system’s ability to meet its goals?  
! How will the community’s relationship and regard of public transit change as a result of 
fare-free policy (Hodge et al., 1994)? 
 
Effect on Internal Transit Environment 
 
The removal of the farebox will change the vehicle environment.   Proponents of fare-free 
service believe that removing the farebox will eliminate the problem of fare disputes and will 
also eliminate the abuse born by drivers from passengers who equate fare payment with 
ownership of the vehicle.  Much of the transit vehicle driver’s job satisfaction is tied to 
 
10 
interactions with passengers.  Therefore, if the farebox is removed and transit riders experience a 
more welcoming environment due to the removal of this potential psychological barrier, then the 
drivers will also benefit (Hodge et al., 1994).   
 
Further, Hodge et al. (1994) contend that the negative aspects of a fare-free policy have been 
over emphasized by critics.  They believe that: 
• problem riders are not always an issue 
• policy adjustments and educational programs may resolve these problems 
• the severity of the problem riders may vary as a function of whether the system started 
fare-free or if the system converted to fare-free after being well established 
• management attitudes toward the fare-free policy and the communication of these 
attitudes to other transit employees may influence the agency’s fare-free experience.   
 
How will the change in ridership affect quality of performance in areas such as vehicle crowding 
and schedule adherence?  Scheiner and Starling (1974) estimate that while aggregate boarding 
times may increase due to a larger volume of riders, average boarding time should decrease an 
average of 18 percent when the farebox is removed, because both doors may be used for 
boarding purposes and passengers will spend no time searching for the exact change.   
 
 
System Effectiveness 
 
Traditionally, one measure of system effectiveness is the farebox recovery rate.  In support of 
fare-free service, Hodge et al. (1994) state that an overemphasis on farebox recovery is 
counterproductive with respect to the goal of increasing ridership.  They suggest that, instead, 
system effectiveness could be measured by cost per rider, rather than farebox recovery.  In the 
case of Austin, Texas, in the 12 months prior to the fare-free experiment, the average cost per 
rider was $2.51.  During the 15 months of the fare-free experiment, the average cost per rider 
was $1.51 and rose back up to an average cost per rider of $2.18 in the year following the fare-
 
11 
free experiment (Hodge et al., 1994).  Hodge et al. (1994) purport that the system also gained 
some efficiencies because there were no labor and capital expenses associated with collecting 
fares. 
 
 
Community Image 
What is the perception of a transit system within a community?  In current U.S. culture, public 
transit is most often viewed as the option of last resort.  Existing users may view transit 
differently from non-users of transit.  In many cases, automobile users view any increase in taxes 
that fund transit as being unfair to them.  However, many automobile users do not realize that 
society subsidizes auto travel (Yaden, 1998).  In a fare-free transit system, people who usually 
drive may be encouraged to use public transit simply because it does not cost them anything 
more to use public transit.  Improving the community image of transit requires the breakdown of 
barriers that separate the transit-dependent rider from the choice rider and proponents of free 
fares believe that removing the farebox might accomplish this goal (Hodge et al., 1994).   
 
 
DISADVANTAGES OF FARE-FREE TRANSIT IMPLEMENTATION 
 
COST OF FARE-FREE SERVICE 
In larger transit systems, fareboxes generate much more of an agency’s operating revenue than 
smaller systems.  For example, at Miami-Dade Transit, fareboxes generate $70 million per year 
(or 33.33 percent) of the approximately $210 million in operating costs (MDT, 2002).  
Comparatively, in many smaller systems the farebox recovers less than ten percent of the yearly 
operating cost.  Removing the farebox might make fiscal sense in smaller systems.  In fact, the 
costs associated with farebox collection and farebox maintenance might equal the revenue 
collected in some smaller systems, making fare collection an exercise in fiscal futility.  However, 
in larger transit systems, the actual cost of removing the fareboxes will leave the system with a 
very large revenue shortfall, which will need to be filled by some type of public funding.   
 
12 
 
Although the Mercer County (Trenton, NJ) fare-free demonstration was conducted only during 
non-peak hours, their system sustained a loss in peak hour fares as well.  One-fourth (24.7 
percent) of their revenue was lost from the fare-free experiment, with 4.3 percent of that loss 
coming from fare revenue lost during peak transit hours (for reasons explained in the next 
section).  Additionally, Mercer Metro had to provide additional bus service to meet excessively 
high passenger demands during the fare-free hours, causing operation costs to skyrocket 
(Connor, 1979). 
 
The Capital Metro fare-free experience in Austin, Texas mirrors the Mercer Metro results.  Just 
like in Mercer County, the system quickly became overburdened with requirements for capacity 
expansion and a subsequent increase of operating costs. With the cost of maintenance and 
property damage to the Austin system, and the subsequent necessity of hiring off-duty police 
officers for security on the buses, the skyrocketing operating costs became a substantial drain on 
the system.  Officials at Capital Metro described the cost of operation in a fare-free system as 
“staggering” (People for Modern Transit Technical Committee, 2001). 
 
 
 
IMPACT OF FARE-FREE POLICY ON TRANSIT SERVICE 
 
How will the total ridership and quality of service change if a fare-free policy is adopted?  What 
type of rider will a fare-free policy attract to the system?  As mentioned previously, the transit 
industry standard for measuring increase in ridership is fare elasticity (Hodge et al., 1994). 
However, elasticity estimates do not take into account the impact that system-wide fare-free 
implementation can have on encouraging problem riders and what ramifications that might have 
on long-term riders. A farebox may be seen as a psychological barrier to the new transit user, but 
it may also be a barrier in keeping out a less desirable type of transit rider which fare-free 
systems may encourage.  According to Hodge et al. (1994), there are two negative sources of 
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ridership change, which can possibly overwhelm a system and drive away choice ridership: 
 
• Transit riders who would have otherwise walked, carpooled, or ridden bicycles, but 
choose transit because it is free 
• Transit riders who enter the system for the purpose of joy riding, vandalism, and 
harassment of transit riders and employees. 
 
In the Austin, Texas fare-free demonstration, both anecdotal and official data suggest that 
problem riders increased substantially and drove away other riders.  Joy-riding youth and 
inebriated adults, as well as vagrants, increased.  In addition, in both the Mercer Metro and the 
Austin, Texas experiences, problem riders actually drove away many of the regular bus 
commuters.  In none of the experiments did the increase in transit ridership include automobile 
commuters enticed by the fare-free service (Connor, 1979; Kounes, 1993; People for Modern 
Transit Technical Committee, 2001).  
 
The relationship of fare reduction and attracting ridership is much more complex than what is 
represented by fare elasticity.  Other interrelated factors are also important in assessing the 
impact of fare reduction.  Based upon studies of ridership and stated preferences of both riders 
and non-riders, the cost of riding public transit (fares) ranks lower than other factors which 
influence ridership, such as: 
 
• Safety 
• Cost of driving (gas and parking) 
• Service frequency and reliability 
• Availability and ease of use of schedule and route information 
• Amenities (e.g., shelters) and driver courtesy 
• Fares/cost of service (Yaden, 1998). 
 
In fact, a study by Cervero (1990) concludes that service frequency is at least twice as important 
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as the price of fares in determining customer satisfaction and ridership.  Research conducted by 
the Center for Urban Transportation Research reinforces those conclusions through customer 
satisfaction surveys at transit systems in Florida.  In one transit system, “system design” 
(frequency, routing, and on-time performance) made up 24 percent of overall passenger 
satisfaction and value (price) comprised only 10 percent.  In another transit system, “Timeliness” 
(frequency, on-time performance, and time to make trip) comprised 28 percent of overall 
passenger satisfaction while value comprised only six percent. (Cleland and Thompson, 2000) 
 
IMPACT ON QUALITY OF SERVICE 
 
As noted previously, there are three parts to assessing the impact on quality of service:  
! How does the increase in ridership affect the internal transit environment?  
! How will the change in ridership change the transit system’s goals of mobility, 
environmental quality, and land use patterns?   
! How will the community’s perception of public transit change as a result of the fare-free 
policy (Hodge et al., 1994)? 
 
Effect on Internal Transit Environment 
Fare-free systems can attract problem riders, resulting in vandalism and problems for other 
riders.  The Miami Beach Transportation Management Association sponsors electric shuttle bus 
service in Miami Beach..  For the first year of operations, the service was offered for free.  This 
new service attracted over a million riders in its first year, with only seven buses in operation.  
However, the free fares also attracted undesirable passengers.  According to Judy Evans, the 
Miami Beach TMA Director, “The institution of a $.25 fare eliminated the unwanted passengers 
and resulted in a 90 percent reduction in vandalism.”  These types of problems may increase 
personal security and psychological costs of transit use much more than a farebox.  In addition, 
the absence of fares can make riders feel a lack of responsibility for the well being of the transit 
system, resulting in a negative impact on driver satisfaction.  In the Trenton, New Jersey fare-
free experiment, 92 percent of transit drivers found their jobs to be less enjoyable as a result of 
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the fare-free program (Connor, 1979).  And, in the Austin, Texas experiment, officials claim that 
transit operators came close to “insurrection” as their transit system became flooded with truant 
school children, vagrants, and other “dubious categories” of passengers (People for Modern 
Transit Technical Committee, 2001).  It is important to note that these findings contradict the 
findings by Hodge et al. (1994) that eliminating the fare would result in a more positive 
environment for transit vehicle operators due to the fact that they wouldn’t have to argue with 
passengers over fares.  However, the psychological barrier of the farebox and hunting for change 
and dealing with paper transfers could be minimized with new fare structures (e.g., an all-day 
pass) or new farebox technology, which would eliminate transfers and accept stored-value cards 
or even credit cards.  This technology should drastically reduce fare-related arguments between 
passengers and operators.   
 
Psychological costs in personal security and physical crowding seen in these fare-free 
demonstrations may actually cause more problems than the psychological cost of the farebox.  
Problem riders increase personal security costs of transit use and cause a decrease in ridership of 
both new and existing choice riders (Hodge et al., 1994).  This view is supported by Peter Foote, 
member of the Transportation Research Board Bus Transit Systems Committee, who notes that, 
“I share others’ concern with the impact of free fares on things like graffiti and other acts of 
vandalism.  There might also be an impact on passenger safety if one presumes that transit fares 
can act as a barrier to access for those intent on thievery.”   Further, as evidenced in the Austin 
experiment, choice riders do not immediately return to the system once they’ve been driven out, 
and the system must prove itself over time to disenfranchised riders (PMT Technical Committee, 
2001).  
 
Will the addition of new riders also cause increases in boarding time and problems with schedule 
adherence?  Steiner and Starling (1974) claim that eliminating the farebox may cause a decrease 
in average boarding times, but it will cause an increase in aggregate boarding times.  The reality 
is that increased ridership will result in more crowding, which will negatively impact boarding 
times.  Additionally, schedule adherence will be negatively impacted by a larger number of 
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people riding the bus short distances who might have otherwise walked.  In the Trenton, New 
Jersey fare-free experiment, the schedule adherence was so poor that drivers were not able to 
take allotted breaks or leave their buses at the end of the line (Studenmund, Swan, & Connor, 
1979).   
 
 
System Effectiveness 
 
As previously mentioned, system effectiveness can be measured by the farebox recovery rate.  
Fare-free advocates suggest that system effectiveness could instead be measured by per rider 
cost.  In another example, consider a fairly large transit system that moved approximately 
270,000 riders per day.  If that system experienced a 30 percent increase in ridership due to fare-
free program implementation, it would have an increase of approximately 81,000 riders per day, 
based on fare elasticity analysis.  Based upon the information from both Mercer Metro and  
Capital Metro (Austin, Texas), most transit systems could not recover from such a loss of 
revenue, even if the system might be regarded as more efficient on a cost-per-passenger basis.  
Imagine that the system becomes overwhelmed with passengers, and must provide expansion of 
service.  Also imagine that the system must now pay for maintaining the system in the face of 
vandalism and property damage from problem passengers, as well as hiring off-duty police 
officers to control security incidents.  Without passenger-generated revenues, most transit 
systems would be unable to pay for additional services.  Even if a transit system finds a 
replacement source of funds to pay for the revenues lost due to the fare-free policy, expenses 
will increase due to the many reasons noted above.  The replacement source of revenue will not 
be as effective as it might otherwise be to help pay for service improvements choice riders seek. 
 
Community Image 
 
If fare-free transit is implemented and the system becomes inundated with problem riders, 
vandalism, and personal crimes, the system will be viewed negatively and choice riders will not 
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be attracted to it.  In trying to remove barriers that separate the transit-dependent rider from the 
choice rider, such as removing the farebox, the transit system may instead have unwittingly 
erected other barriers which are far more damaging to the image of the system.  The types of 
problem riders which may be encouraged into the system by a fare-free policy may damage the 
system’s public image, as well as damage the system physically and financially for a very long 
time after the fare-free demonstration has been discontinued.  Jeff Arndt, Vice President and 
Chief Operating Officer of Metro in Houston noted, “We stopped doing system-wide free fares 
several years ago.  A large group of high school students cut classes and rode around for free and 
started trouble in the Central Business District.  We got a lot of negative press on ‘encouraging’ 
truancy.”  Given these very serious repercussions, care must be taken in assessing if fare-free 
policies would be beneficial or detrimental to a particular system and community. 
 
 
CASE STUDIES 
TEMPORARY FARE-FREE EXPERIMENTS 
 
Two of the largest fare-free demonstrations were conducted in the late 1970s in Trenton, New 
Jersey and Denver, Colorado.  Both projects lasted slightly more than one year between 1978 
and 1979, and were implemented on an off-peak basis.  In Trenton, the primary motivation for 
the experiment was social and economic redevelopment of the area.  In Denver, the primary 
motivation for the experiment was reducing pollution and automobile use (Hodge et al., 1994). 
The Denver experiment resulted in a 36 percent increase in ridership and the Trenton experiment 
resulted in a 16 percent increase in ridership (Doxsey and Spear, 1981).   
 
Many fare-free advocates express concern with the methodology of these two experiments, the 
first being that both experiments were run during off-peak hours only.  If the motivation was to 
promote transit use and reduce congestion, then perhaps the experiments should have been run 
during peak periods (Hodge et al., 1994). 
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A medium-sized transit system that experimented with total fare-free service was Austin, Texas. 
 The experiment ran from October 1989 to December 1990.  Ridership increased 75 percent 
during the experiment, but expanded service likely accounts for some of this percentage (Capital 
Metro, 1991), and the PMT Technical Committee (2001) claims that once the ridership increase 
is adjusted for normal growth and addition of University of Texas student passengers, the initial 
jump really only amounted to a 10 percent increase.  This trial was regarded on the one hand by 
Capital Metro Board members and management as a successful marketing experiment to 
increase ridership.  However, it was also regarded as disastrous in terms of attracting problem 
riders who drive away choice ridership and raise agency expenses due to damage to vehicles and 
property and the requirement for substantial security expenses (PMT Technical Committee, 
2001).  Additionally, 215 (75 percent of) transit operators petitioned to have the fare-free 
program discontinued immediately, due to the abuse they were experiencing at the hands of 
problem riders (Kounes, 1993). 
 
A similar result occurred in the late 1980s when Broward County Transit allowed all passengers 
under the age of 18 to ride for free.  System managers described conditions on many routes to be 
chaotic.  Within six months, at the urging of bus operators, the free fare program for youth was 
discontinued in favor of allowing them to ride for half-fare.   
 
When summing up the experience of these fare-free demonstrations: 
 
• All systems showed a substantial ridership increase 
• There is little evidence that these projects made a significant dent in Single Occupant 
Vehicle travel during peak hours 
• Public reaction to fareless demonstrations were positive, but riders complained about 
deterioration of safety and service quality 
• Bus operators voiced concerns over increased rowdiness, problem passengers, and the 
effect on schedules  (Kounes, 1993; Yaden, 1998). 
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PERMANENT FARE-FREE TRANSIT SYSTEMS 
 
The oldest fare-free system is located in Commerce, California, just outside of Los Angeles.  
This system has operated fare-free since 1962.  According to the manager of this system, they do 
not experience problems with riders other than occasional graffiti (Hodge et al., 1994).  
However, this is a very small system, serving approximately 970,000 riders annually with 11 
buses.  Although this system is located only six miles outside of Los Angeles, transit officials tell 
us that since they have such a limited travel area, they do not attract problem riders (City of 
Commerce Transit, 2002). 
 
The next oldest system is located in Amherst, Massachusetts and has been providing fare-free 
service since 1976.  The Amherst, Massachusetts system is free to all, but is partially funded by a 
yearly student fees.   This system serves five colleges in the area and also the surrounding 
communities.  It serves approximately 6 million passengers every year and operates 
approximately 40 buses (UMass, 2002).  This type of service is in place at many universities 
throughout the country, and seems to be relatively problem-free. 
 
Island County Transit, located in Washington State, has operated a fare-free system since its 
inception in 1987.  According to Director Martha Rose, Island County Transit has a low 
occurrence of problem passengers.  It has 16 fixed-route buses and 2 paratransit buses.  They 
serve 675,775 passengers per year on their fixed-route service and 19,664 passengers annually 
on their paratransit routes (Island County Transit, 2002).  Rose attributes their success with a 
three-strikes policy and to educational programs in the schools.  The only complaints noted for 
this system were the need for more park and ride lots and buses to deal with increasing ridership 
demands.   
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It is important to note that all of the permanent fare-free systems listed above started out as fare-
free systems and are either small systems, or serve limited populations (e.g., UMass serves a 
community with five colleges).  In addition, all of the successful fare-free systems shown in this 
synthesis serve small cities or rural areas. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In order to assess if a fare-free policy would benefit a transit system, there are several questions 
that must be addressed: 
• What is the net cost of a fare free policy? 
In smaller systems (i.e., those with less than one million in annual ridership), the 
net farebox recovery is usually less than ten percent (Gregg, Joslin, Mistretta, and 
Morris, 2002).  The cost of collection might cancel out any net proceeds of fare 
collection.  Additionally, most systems operating in smaller communities do not 
experience the same types of problem riders experienced in larger, more 
metropolitan areas.  Also, being that there are less riders, bus operators may be 
better able to monitor and remember problem riders, refusing them service before 
they are able to damage the system. 
 
In larger systems, the net farebox recovery is typically much greater than smaller 
systems, and the revenue is a substantial portion of the operating budget.  As 
evidenced by the Capital Metro fare-free experiment in Austin, Texas, which only 
had a 15 percent farebox recovery, the ballooning costs of operations due to 
maintenance, labor, and security costs financially threatened the well being of the 
system.  In addition, the cost of the deterioration of the internal bus environment, 
security, employee satisfaction, and public image was definitely not worth the 
benefits purported to be gained by removing the farebox (Kounes, 1993; People 
for Modern Transit Technical Committee, 2001).  Frances Chung, Director of 
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Financial Services for GO Transit in Toronto, Canada strongly advises against a 
fare-free system, stating “Consider the implication that if there is no fare charged, 
vandalism might be unmanageable.  I believe there must be some payment, no 
matter how low, so that there is respect for the service, the system, and our fellow 
passengers.”  Jeff Lange, TRB Bus Transit Systems member also warns of the 
philosophical danger of free fares, noting, “Be aware that when one moves the 
price of something to zero, in addition to challenging capacity, one is stating that 
the product or service is not an economic good—that is, that it has NO value.  
Pricing signals value.  I would suggest you keep it non-zero”.   
 
• What will be the impact of a fare-free policy on ridership and quality of service? 
It is true that a fare-free policy will yield substantial gains in ridership.  What is 
important is the type of ridership that is being gained.  Will the types of people 
attracted to the system be positive or negative for the system?  Will the 
implementation of fare-free service overwhelm the system with overcrowding and 
problem riders, driving away veteran and choice users?  Transit consultant and 
Leadership APTA member Diane Kravif recalled the time BART, in the San 
Francisco Bay area, offered a couple of months of free fares as an apology to their 
customers after experiencing problems with their train control systems.  Ms. 
Kravif notes that, “From the commuters’ point of view it was awful!  A lot of 
people who didn’t normally ride BART spent all their time joy riding.  It was very 
crowded and the regular commuters had problems even getting on the trains!”  
Joe Stitcher, Deputy Director of Santa Monica’s Big Blue Bus (the local public 
transit agency) notes the experience his city had with a fare-free shuttle:  “About 
seven years ago, the City of Santa Monica operated a downtown shuttle that also 
served the beach, some local hotels, and some local points of interest.  It was fare-
free and there was a problem with individuals who would board the bus and ride 
around continuously, sometimes for hours at a time.  This happened a lot during 
inclement weather.  It was apparent that these folks had nowhere else to go.  As a 
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result, the general public didn’t want to ride the shuttle, and complained 
frequently to the City Manager’s office about the smell, the baggage these folks 
carried, etc.  Some of the hotels that funded the service (in part) wanted to stop 
paying because their guests didn’t want to ride the shuttle.  Although policies 
(e.g., limiting an individual to one round trip, any carry-on item had to fit on their 
lap, etc.) were implemented, they were not very effective and led to conflicts with 
the drivers.  The implementation of a $0.25 fare reduced the problem 
significantly.” 
 
• How will a fare-free policy impact the attainment of the community’s goals? 
Will fare-free service increase mobility for transit-dependent riders in the 
community?  Will fare-free service advance environmental and traffic congestion 
goals?  Will fare-free service cause a positive perception of the transit system in 
the long term?  Will fare-free service cause an increase or decrease in customer 
service and satisfaction?   
 
It seems that fare-free service in certain communities with smaller transit systems can be a 
positive experience, as evidenced by long-running fare-free services in systems such as 
Commerce, California; Amherst, Massachusetts; and Island County Transit in Washington.  
However, the experience with fare-free service in large urban areas has not been successful in 
terms of overall service quality.  Some researchers question the methodology within these fare-
free demonstrations: two of the larger systems discussed in this report (Denver and Trenton) 
offered the fare-free service during peak transit hours only. It is not clear if a more choice 
ridership might have been attracted during peak hours.  It could be that off-peak times actually 
attract more problem riders, while not assisting in the attainment goals such as promoting transit 
use, increasing mobility, and reducing traffic congestion and pollution. 
 
In the case of Austin, Texas, fare-free service was provided all day, and there were no time limits 
set on the demonstration.  Additionally, although significant efforts were made to increase 
 
23 
passenger safety and comfort through hiring off-duty police officers, Hodge et al. (1994) claim 
that many of the Austin demonstration’s problems stemmed from lack of support for the policy 
from agency managers and lack of planning and scheduling for overload on specific routes.  
However, many others point to the fact that a fare-free policy simply overwhelms the system, 
significantly increasing operating costs.  While the fare-free demonstration project resulted in 
increased ridership for the system, most of the increase came from expanded services and 
previous users using the service more frequently.  The fare-free experiment did not serve to 
increase choice ridership or to improve the public image of the system.  In fact, the opposite 
occurred; problem riders were attracted to the system, and vandalism and crime increased (PMT 
Technical Committee, 2001).  Physical assaults tripled in the first three months of the fare-free 
implementation, increasing to 120 incidences from 44 in the three months prior to 
implementation (Brooks, 1990).  Many faithful riders were driven from the system by fear for 
personal safety and the deterioration of the bus environment.  And, these riders were not quick to 
return to the system once the fare-free demonstration was discontinued (Kounes, 1993; PMT 
Technical Committee, 2001). 
 
Lawrence Hughes, Director of Service Development for Green Bus Lines and member of the 
TRB Bus Transit Systems Committee agrees that free fares in large urban areas might easily 
provide negative results.  He notes, “For most people, urban transit fares are very low and 
decisions on use of transit for most journey-to-work trips are based on other factors, such as 
overall travel time, comfort, and convenience.  To someone making $50,000 a year or more, 
paying $1 to go to work or not to go to work won’t make a difference.  Yet, by eliminating the 
$1 fare, other people who are not going to work and for whom $1 is a barrier (e.g., the homeless) 
will be further enticed to ride the system, not necessarily for any productive trip but as a respite 
from the elements and an opportunity for panhandling.  The presence of these passengers could 
well tilt the system so that the choice passengers who value comfort and convenience over fare 
will tilt their decision to the privacy afforded by the automobile rather than having to share space 
that they consider undesirable.  In the end, the additional trips made by the previously less-
mobile population will not have been offset by reduction in their automobile trips, but previous 
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transit trips might then be made by automobile.  Thus a free-fare system could well result in a 
poorer environment than a nominal fare system.”  
 
In the report by Hodge et al. (1994), which espouses the benefits of fare-free policy, the authors 
stop short of recommending fare-free implementation for larger systems.  They instead advocate 
achieving better system efficiency and more choice ridership via marketing of prepaid fares.  If a 
transit system is trying to attract a certain type of rider with the incentive of fare-free service, 
why not market the fare-free service directly to that population?  For example, a transit system 
might market passes to surrounding businesses and universities on a prepaid basis.  Prepaid fare 
marketing to choice rider populations would seem to be a more efficient way of increasing 
choice ridership, increasing mobility, and decreasing traffic congestion and pollution.  
Additionally, issues such as safety, travel time, frequency and reliability of service, availability 
and ease of schedule and route information, infrastructure at stops, and driver courtesy, were all 
found to be more important than the cost of fares in attracting choice ridership (Yaden, 1998).  
Perhaps transit organizations should also focus on maintaining and improving these amenities, in 
addition to offering more economic travel options to encourage choice ridership. 
 
In a study performed in the Spring of 1990, during the fare-free demonstration period, Capital 
Metro asked both riders and the general public for the five most important factors in determining 
whether to ride the bus.  The five most important factors were:  
 
• On-board safety 
• On-time performance 
• Convenience of routes 
• Cleanliness inside the buses 
• Frequency of service   
 
Surprisingly enough to fare-free advocates, the three least important factors in determining if 
both riders and the general public would ride the bus were: 
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• Cost of service; 
• Outside appearance of the buses; 
• Courtesy of the bus operators (Kounes, 1993). 
 
These results coincide with those of Cervero (1990) and Yaden (1998), which state that service 
and safety are much more important to riders than the cost of riding.  Transit systems desiring to 
increase choice ridership should instead focus on improving service quality and safety for 
customers, as opposed to offering free service.  Even a minimum fare offers a barrier to problem 
riders causing a deterioration in the service, image, and comfort of a given transit system.  It 
cannot be stressed strongly enough that system wide fare-free policy is not advised for larger 
systems and has the potential to irreparably harm the infrastructure, morale, and public image of 
a transit organization.  Michael Kemp of Charles Rivers and Associates who performed a 
considerable amount of research on transit pricing for the Urban Mass Transit Administration 
summarizes such feelings by stating “Fare-free is a proposal that comes up periodically at the 
national and local levels, but happily common sense usually prevails.  Widespread (as distinct 
from targeted) free fares are a bad idea whose time has long since passed.”  
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